Impact of Basel II on Bank Portfolios in Australia by Khan, Muhammad Saifuddin & Islam, Md. Shahidul
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/EJBM 
Vol.11, No.5, 2019 
 
25 
Impact of Basel II on Bank Portfolios in Australia 
 
Dr. Muhammad Saifuddin Khan1*      Dr. Md. Shahidul Islam2 
1. Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, University of Dhaka, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh 
2.Associate Professor, Department of Banking and Insurance, University of Dhaka, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the sensitivity of various risk-weighted assets and liabilities to regulatory capital ratios of 
domestic and foreign banks in Australia. In particular, this paper investigates whether the growth of various risk-
weighted assets changes during the post-Basel II period and whether those changes are caused by the more rigorous 
capital regulation introduced by the Basel II. The empirical analysis shows that Australian local banks is found to 
experience a substantial increase of the high-risk weighted assets (namely, non-residential loans) and subordinated 
debt with respect to their tier 1 capital ratio. The same changes, however, are found to have insignificant influence 
on the growth of low-risk weighted assets and total asset.      
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1 Introduction 
Banks have an incentive to alter their asset portfolios from high-risk weighted assets to low-risk weighted assets 
in order to comply with the more rigorous risk-weighted capital regulation. This paper analyses the sensitivity of 
various risk-weighted assets and liabilities of domestic and foreign banks in Australia to regulatory capital ratios 
(Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital Ratio). In particular, this paper investigates whether the growth of various 
risk-weighted assets changes during the post-Basel II period and whether those changes are caused by the more 
rigorous capital regulation introduced by the Basel II. The empirical analysis shows the following findings with 
respect to the regulatory changes of Basel II. First, Australian local banks is found to experience a substantial 
increase of the high-risk weighted assets (namely, non-residential loans) and subordinated debt with respect to 
their tier 1 capital ratio. The same changes, however, are found to have insignificant influence on the growth of 
low-risk weighted assets and total asset. This paper rejects the capital crunch hypothesis and credit crunch 
hypothesis because the stricter capital regulations associated with Basel II do not induce Australian banks to reduce 
their assets and loans. Hence, this paper rejects the idea that more rigorous capital regulation induces Australian 
banks to reallocate their asset portfolio from high-risk weighted assets to low-risk weighted assets. 
Australian banks are financially healthy and maintain sound capital. They are well-capitalized with a resistant 
funding base (Hawtrey, 2009). In addition, Australian banks were not affected by the recent global financial crisis 
and no Australian banks were required to bail out and/or write-down loans abnormally during the global financial 
crisis supported by the study of Hawthery (2009).  Therefore, the general wisdom suggests that Australian banks 
may not be affected by changes in the capital regulation. 
• The changes in regulation affect the risk-based capital ratios, which eventually require the banks to 
adjust their portfolio. A capital-constrained bank can recover capital ratio either by reducing assets 
or by increasing equity capital (Hyun and Rhee, 2011)). Raising equity capital is not at all costless, 
in particular, when information asymmetry exists between investors and banks(Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Research also shows that the market for bank equity is imperfect and the presence of agency 
costs and tax disadvantages interrupts the issuing new equity of banks (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 
2004)). Consequently banks are obliged to maintain the  regulatory capital in association with credit 
supply (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). This means that  banks may have to shrink their loan 
supply for maintaining the regulatory capital (Watanabe, 2007) and accordingly, they have to adjust 
their portfolio decisions. Taking this view, this paper investigates the effect of risk-based capital 
ratios, introduced by Bank for International Settlements (hereafter, BIS), on bank portfolio decisions 
of Australian banks. In other words, are the adjustments of asset portfolios, if any, of Australian 
banks accompanied by the implementation of more rigorous capital adequacy requirements 
introduced by Basel II? 
While Australian banks rarely  needed to raise equity for maintaining the lending supply as a result of the 
implementation of Basel II (Hawtrey, 2009), the stricter capital standard imposed under Basel II may force banks 
to shrink their assets, a phenomenon described as capital crunch hypothesis (Peek and Rosengren, 1995b). Several 
studies provide empirical support of the capital crunch hypothesis followed by capital regulation introduced by 
Basel I (Hall, 1993, Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995a, Peek and Rosengren, 1995b). Empirical and theoretical studies 
find the linkage between capital crunch and credit crunch (Peek and Rosengren, 1995b, Berger and Udell, 1994, 
Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995b), the latter being the outcome of the former due to capital regulation (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1995a).  
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Not surprisingly, the stricter regulations not only induce the banks to shrink their assets and loans but also 
increase low-risk weighted assets. Prior empirical studies including (Hall, 1993, Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995a, 
Berger and Udell, 1994, Peek and Rosengren, 1995a)) support this argument. They find that the regulatory changes 
brought about by Basel I caused U.S. banks to reduce lending in high-risk assets and thus Basel I is recognized as 
a cause of credit crunch. Similar consequences are also experienced by Japanese (Ito and Sasaki, 2002, Watanabe, 
2007, Brana and Lahet, 2009). The only exception is the study of Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998), who rather find 
that the implementation of Basel I induce the capital-constrained banks of Japan to increase their loan supply more 
swiftly albeit for the short-term only. Recent studies including (Hyun and Rhee, 2011, Jacques, 2008, Memmel 
and Raupach, 2010) and Hyun & Rhee (2011) find that the capital regulation introduced by Basel II also influence 
banks to reduce total risk-weighted assets by adjusting asset portfolio. While there are few researches which study 
the impact of capital regulations on Australian banks, no prior research addressed the impact of the changes of 
capital regulation made by Basel II on the Australian banks’ loan supply and asset portfolio choice. This paper 
attempts to fill that gap.  
Basel II, which was implemented in Australia on January 2008, imposes more rigorous capital adequacy 
requirement than Basel I. As noted earlier, in response to Basel II, a bank can raise its capital ratio either by 
increasing capital or by reducing risk-weighted assets. It also suggests that capital can be increased by issuing new 
equities, subordinated debt, and preferred stock or by increasing loan loss reserves up to a maximum of 1.25% of 
risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets can be reduced by rebalancing the asset portfolio, which can be 
achieved by replacing high risk-weighted assets such as loans or equity holdings with low risk-weighted assets 
such as government bonds and mortgages. A related question is have the growth of various risky assets been 
affected by the changes of capital regulation come with Basel II (Research Question 1)? And if so, is the growth 
of various risky assets different in the pre- and post-Basel II period (Research Question 2)? In order to answer 
these research questions, we use the Balance sheet data for the period of 2000-2010 from 14 local and 8 foreign 
banks operating in Australia. We expect that the analysis would enable one to gauge the sensitivity of various risk-
weighted assets and liabilities to regulatory capital ratios (Total Capital Ratio and Tier 1 Capital Ratio). The data 
are collected from Bankscope. 
Our empirical analysis indicates the following set of findings. First, we find that local banks of Australia face 
higher growth of non-residential loans in the post-Basel II period and the growth of that is affected by the 
regulatory changes caused by Basel II. Second, Basel II affects the higher growth of subordinated debt in the post-
Basel II period. Third, Basel II does not affect the growth of total assets and low-risk assets. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two describes motivation and research objective 
followed by literature review and hypotheses in Section three. Data and methodology are described in Section four, 
while Section five presents the empirical findings including followed by robustness check in Section six. Section 
seven highlights the limitation and further research implications followed by a conclusion in Section eight. 
 
2 Motivation and Research Objective 
Basel II introduces more rigorous capital regulation than Basel I. Therefore, Basel II may cause Australia banks 
to alter their asset portfolios from high-risk assets to low-risk assets. That is, Basel II requires that Australian banks 
revise their asset portfolios from heavily risk-weighted assets such as loans and equity investments to low risk-
weighted assets such as mortgages and government securities. The issue is very important and so far there is no 
evidence of this issue in the Australian context. The motivation of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
the introduction of Basel II and the asset portfolio decision of Australian banks.  
Another objective of this research is to identify whether the sensitivity of risk-based capital ratios to the asset 
holdings is different in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II period. It also tries to identify whether the asset holdings 
contract or expand due to the implementation of Basel II and whether banks issue equity or subordinated debt to 
maintain the risk-adjusted capital ratio. Thus, the analysis covers the effect of capital regulation on the growth of 
both assets and liabilities.  
 
3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The prior literature includes numerous studies of how the Basel agreements may have affected banks’ asset 
portfolio. Literature review is divided into three subsections on the basis of Basel I, II and III. Due to the difference 
between sample periods and financial markets examined, different researches found banks adjusting their asset 
portfolios differently in response to different capital regulations. This is highlighted in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.1 Basel I 
As issuing capital is more expensive than collecting deposits, risk-based capital may be viewed as a regulatory tax 
that is higher on assets, which are assigned higher risk weights. Therefore, it was expected that implementation of 
risk-based capital under Basel I would encourage banks to substitute out of high-risk weighted assets and into low-
risk weighted assets. Montgomery (2005) tries to find whether banks adjust their asset portfolios by r
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risk weighted assets and increasing low-risk weighted assets due to the stricter capital adequacy requirement 
introduced under Basel I. During the post-Basel I period, international banks in Japan with relatively low core 
capital ratios are likely to contract their overall assets and reallocate their asset portfolio from heavily-weighted 
risky assets, such as loans and corporate bonds, to zero-weighted riskless assets such as government bonds 
(Montgomery, 2005). International banks in Japan issue more subordinated debt in the post-Basel I period 
(Montgomery, 2005). Again, Basel I induces U.S. commercial banks to shift away from high-risk assets such as 
loans towards low-risk assets such as government securities and the portfolio shift triggers the substantial reduction 
in bank lending (Hall, 1993). As a result, Basel I has been considered as one of the major causes of the credit 
crunch (Hall, 1993). Similarly, Brikmann and Horvitz (1995) find that Basel I creates U.S. bankers  reluctant to 
lend. Berger and Udell (1994) also find that Basel I compels U.S. banks to reduce commercial loans and increase 
holdings of government securities. Hogan and Sharpe (1990)  analyse the initial application of Basel I to three 
major Australian banks named Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, National Australia Bank Ltd. and 
Westpac Banking Corporation. The risk-adjusted capital ratio introduced by Basel I is partial in coverage because 
it considers default risk only and might distort the allocation of credit (Hogan and Sharpe, 1990). 
The risk-based capital standard significantly influences the behaviour of Japanese banks and capital-
constrained banks are likely to issue more subordinated debts and to reduce lending (Ito and Sasaki, 2002). 
Similarly, Watanabe (2007) finds that a huge loss of bank capital caused Japanese banks to reduce their lending in 
the fiscal year of 1997. Because capital loss of banks was occurred as a result of a rigorous self-assessment of 
assets requested by the regulator(Watanabe, 2007). But loan supply increased as a result of an injection of public 
capital in fiscal year 1998 which relaxes the capital constraint of banks (Watanabe, 2007).  
Capital regulation may lead to financial crisis and capital injection by the government. Brana and Lahet (2009)  
also suggest that the implementation of risk-based capital ratio under Basel I has significantly affected Japanese 
banking behaviour and is one of the factors that triggers the 1997 Asian crisis. As a result of the enhancement of 
capital requirement, Japanese banks issue new equities and subordinated debts (Brana and Lahet, 2009). Japanese 
banks also cut back their risky assets, especially their foreign assets, as a result of long-lasting stock price fall and 
growing troubles in the banking system since 1990 (Brana and Lahet, 2009). 
The monetary policy affects the shrinkage of assets and loans triggered by capital regulation. As a result of  
a contractionary monetary policy in the post-Basel I period, the loans of the small low-capital banks are reduced 
more than that of high-capital banks (Kishan and Opiela, 2006). However, the loan growth of the low-capital banks 
is not higher compared to that of high capital banks as a result of an expansionary monetary policy (Kishan and 
Opiela, 2006). Also, the lending of high-capital banks is not affected by contractionary monetary policy, but 
expansionary policy induces the small high-capital banks to increase loan growth (Kishan and Opiela, 2006). 
Again, Peek and Rosengren (1995a) identify that capital regulation contracts both bank loan portfolios and bank 
lending. As a result of capital regulation bank-dependent loans contract to a large extent, and this contraction is 
both statistically and economically significant (Peek and Rosengren, 1995a).  
In contrast, few studies reject the idea that stricter capital regulation causes banks to shrink their assets and 
loan supply. Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998)  reject the capital crunch hypothesis and find that Japanese banks with 
lower capital-to-asset ratios are likely to increase their credit supply at a faster rate. Rather an increase in banks’ 
equity capital makes banks more conservative to expand credit supply and banks issue subordinated debts to 
maintain the capital ratio which is a key factor for the absence of capital crunch (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 1998).On 
the other hand, Beatty and Gron (2001)  find no systematic differences between pre- and post-Basel I period 
behaviour of U.S. banks. However, significant differences exist between low-capital banks and other banks(Beatty 
and Gron, 2001). The low-capital banks increase equity significantly greater than other banks as a result of an 
assessment of increase in risk-weighted assets and in order to increase total asset, low-capital banks increase 
heavily risk-weighted assets significantly less than other banks (Beatty and Gron, 2001). 
 
3.2 Basel II 
In order to increase the capital adequacy ratio imposed by the capital regulation, banks can increase equity capital 
or reduce risk-weighted asset by adjusting asset portfolio. Hyun and Rhee (2011) shows that to meet the higher 
capital ratio the existing shareholders of a bank will prefer to reduce high-risk assets to meet the higher capital 
ratio and don’t desire to issue new equity to the public even if there is no cost associated with the equity issue. 
Additionally, Basel II requires banks to estimate the default probability more conservatively during depression 
and they require more capital which may lead to credit crunch (Hyun and Rhee, 2011).  
Again, banks adjust their loan portfolio because of the implementation of Basel II. Jacques (2008)  analyses 
the adjustment of bank’s low and high credit risk commercial loans under Basel II. Capital regulation forces 
capital-constrained banks generally reduce total lending but particularly reduce high-risk loans in response to an 
undesirable capital shock (Jacques, 2008). As a result of an undesirable capital shock, capital-constrained banks 
reduce high credit risk loans and may enhance low credit risk loans and the extent of reduction in high-risk loans 
is more under Basel II compared to Basel I (Jacques, 2008).  
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In order to maintain the capital ratio banks adjust the asset portfolio. Banks try to maintain a certain capital 
ratio and adjusting the regulatory capital ratio by issuing new equity is more effective than by changing the asset 
portfolio or changing the riskiness of assets (Memmel and Raupach, 2010). Again, commercial banks have 
radically shifted their portfolios to real-estate loans considered as safe assets and mainly the capital-constrained 
banks have restructured their portfolios (Blasko and Sinkey, 2006). But by shifting portfolios into safe assets, such 
as mortgages, although banks are required to maintain lower capital but face more interest-rate risk (Blasko and 
Sinkey, 2006). 
Capital regulation affects the loan pricing of banks. Repullo and Suarez (2004)  analyse the loan pricing 
implications of Basel II. Low risk firms choose banks adopting the IRB approach to borrow at low rate, while 
high-risk firms choose banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach to avoid high borrowing rate 
(Repullo and Suarez, 2004). But bank capital is expected to be less variable under the Basel II compared to Basel 
I (Zicchino, 2006). Under Basel II, the loan risk-weights in the capital ratio are affected by macroeconomic shock 
because a negative macroeconomic shock causes capital constraint tighter and a positive shock causes it looser 
(Zicchino, 2006).  
Banks may maintain capital buffer to capture the variations in minimum capital. During the worse economic 
condition the credit quality is expected to decline and banks will require more capital (Heid, 2007). The excess 
capital is expected to alleviate the impact of changes in capital charges in relation to the cyclicality of lending 
(Heid, 2007). Under Basel I framework the cutback in lending causes a raise in the capital buffer during an 
economic recession but under Basel II the capital buffer will actually decrease during an economic recession, 
because the reduction in lending will generally be overcompensated by the increase in the average risk weights 
(Heid, 2007). Davis (2005) states Basel II could affect the fund supply and lending rate of banks. If the true risks 
are not reflected accurately by the regulatory risk weight schedules under the standardised approach, loan pricing 
and credit availability can be distorted (Davis, 2005).  
 
3.3 Basel III 
Systemic risk is the risk of distress in the financial system caused by an imbalance or a failure of a significant part 
of the financial sector that can potentially cause severe negative consequences for the real economy. It is found in 
the work of Stefan (2011) that systemic risk appears endogenously and comes with negative externalities, which 
cause financial instability. Basel III needs further regulatory adjustments such as a risk-weighted leverage ratio; a 
more detailed  treatment for procyclicality; adjustments for the NSFR (Net Stable Funding ratio); and 
internalization of negative externalities from financial institutions (Stefan, 2011). According to the study of 
Simone (2011), the new capital requirement for incremental credit risks under Basel III might  be significantly 
higher than the existing capital regulations and Basel III will cause a much greater increase in capital. However, 
banks may be able to report lower sensitivity to Basel III because the risk reductions can be achieved through 
hedging (Simone, 2011). Davis (2011) raises the issue that whether the liquidity adequacy in both systemic stress 
and individual bank stress can be managed by one policy instrument named liquidity coverage ratio of Basel III. 
Furthermore, it is very much critical to determine the appropriate fee for the fee based liquidity facility at the 
Reserve Bank of Australia to maintain the shortage of high quality liquid assets proposed by Basel III (Davis, 
2011). 
 
3.4 Summary of Literature 
The existing literature shows that the stricter capital regulation causes banks to shrink assets which is named as 
capital crunch hypothesis (Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995a, Peek and Rosengren, 1995a). In addition, the current 
literature finds the evidence of credit crunch hypothesis, which predicts that more rigorous capital regulation 
induces banks to reduce loan supply (Hyun and Rhee, 2011, Berger and Udell, 1994). Again, the capital-
constrained banks reallocate their asset portfolios from high-risk assets to low-risk assets because of the 
implementation of the stricter capital regulation (Montgomery, 2005, Jacques, 2008, Hall, 1993). As a result of 
capital regulation banks adjust their asset portfolios more often than liabilities (Memmel and Raupach, 2010).  
Basel II increases procyclicality and a negative macroeconomic shock makes capital constraint tighter whereas a 
positive shock makes it looser (Zicchino, 2006); (Heid, 2007, Jacques, 2008). No prior study addresses the issue 
of the shrinkage of assets and loans and the reallocation of asset portfolio in the Australian context because of the 
changes in capital regulation come with Basel II. This research fills that gap. 
 
3.5 Summary of Hypotheses 
Based on the above discussion, we develop four hypotheses related to the first research question of this paper 
(RQ1: Have the growth of various risky assets been affected by the changes of capital regulation come with Basel 
II?) 
H1:The changes in the capital regulations made by Basel II cause a decrease in the growth of heavily risk-weighted 
assets  
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H2:The changes in the capital regulations made by Basel II cause an increase in the growth of low risk-weighted 
assets 
H3:The changes in the capital regulations made by Basel II cause a decrease in the growth of total assets 
H4:The changes in the capital regulations made by Basel II cause an increase in the growth of equity and 
subordinated debt 
Related to the second research question (RQ 2: Is the growth of various risky assets different in the pre- and post-
Basel II period?), we develop four hypotheses as follows: 
H5:The growth of heavily risk-weighted assets is lower in the post-Basel II period compared to the pre-Basel-II 
period 
H6:The growth of low risk-weighted assets is higher in the post-Basel II period compared to the pre-Basel-II period 
H7:The growth of total assets is lower in the post-Basel II period compared to the pre-Basel-II period 
H8:The growth of equity and subordinated debt is higher in the post-Basel II period compared to the pre-Basel-II 
period 
 
4 Data and Methodology 
This section discusses about the data and methodology of this paper. This paper uses panel data from all 14 local 
and 8 foreign banks operating in Australia for the fiscal years 2000-2010 in order to examine the impact of capital 
adequacy regulation on bank portfolios. Basel III capital requirement was finalised on June 2011. As we stated, 
the objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of Basel II capital requirement in Australia, so we limit our 
dataset for the empirical study until 2010. Data are collected from the banks’ balance sheets and income statements. 
This paper analyses local and foreign banks separately because of their mode of operation and differences in 
services they offer. 
Balance sheet data of total assets, total loans, mortgages, investment in equity securities, investment in 
government securities, equity, subordinated debt, and capital ratios of individual banks are collected from 
Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Annual data of individual Australian banks have been used in 
this paper. For all the banks, please note that the company data are used and not the consolidated one. Data that 
are missing in Bankscope have been collected from the annual reports of individual banks. Balance sheet data also 
have been collected from Fin Analysis, Mint Global and Connect4.  
The variable weighted-average rate on credit outstanding for large businesses is considered as Lending Rates. 
Lending Rates are collected from Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-
year term deposit rate is considered as the borrowing rate. In addition, deposit rates are collected from RBA’s retail 
deposit rate and investment rates statistics. Original annual expenditure on gross domestic product (GDP) at current 
prices has been collected from Australian Bureau of Statistics. Lending rates, borrowing rates and GDP are 
matched to year ending of banks. 
 
4.1 Operationalization of Variables 
In this paper, loan and equity investment are considered as high-risk assets. Subordinated debt and mortgages are 
considered as low-risk assets. As mortgages are a part of total loans, they are separated from total loans and hence 
the residual of total loans is called as Net Loan, which is actually non-residential loan. This will help to analyse 
the impact of capital regulations on non-residential loans. The growth rate of GDP and spread between lending 
rate and deposit rate of banks have been considered as a factor to influence the growth of banks’ assets. 
The variables and their operationalization are summarized below: 
TCR = Total Capital Ratio = 
			
			
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	
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	
	
 
T1CR = Tier 1 Capital Ratio = 
			


	
			
	
 
Tier 1 capital = Equity + Noncumulative preferred stock net of goodwill 
Tier 2 capital = Cumulative perpetual preferred stock + Certain types of 99-year debenture issues + Loan loss 
reserves + Subordinated debt (i.e., debt subordinated to depositors) with an original maturity of more than five 
years.  
Total capital ratio and tier 1 capital ratio are calculated according to Basel rules. 
 
4.2 The Model 
The model and variables of this paper are an extension of the previous study by  Montgomery (2005). This analysis 
tries to identify the empirical relationship between the growth of various classes of bank’s assets with the bank’s 
risk-adjusted capital ratio, both before and after the implementation of Basel II in Australia on January 2008. This 
paper also analyses whether the banks issue equity and/or subordinated debt to maintain the growth of total risk-
weighted assets because growth of total risk-weighted assets requires more capital to maintain the capital ratio. In 
this paper, two types of capital ratios, total capital ratio and tier 1 capital ratio, are considered. Montgomery (2005) 
uses book-based capital-to-asset ratio but this paper uses risk-adjusted capital ratio, calculated according to the 
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Basel rules. The growth of banks’ assets is influenced by macroeconomic events. The lagged differential between 
loan and deposit rates and lagged GDP growth are considered to control for macroeconomic events. Here, it is 
considered that the growth of an asset depends on its last year’s growth rate, lagged differential between loan and 
deposit rate, lagged GDP growth rate and capital ratio. The control variables of the model are growth rate of GDP, 
lending rate and deposit rate of banks. 
The model is expressed in equation 1 below: 
∆log(i,t+1) =1 +2 ∆log(i,t) + 3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − +4 ∆log(GDPt) +5 log(TCRi,t) 
+ i,t+1         (1) 
where,i=Individual bank; t= Time period; A= Bank’s various types of assets such as Total asset, Total Loan, Net 
Loan, Equity Investment, Mortgage and Government Securities and Bank’s various types of liabilities such as 
Total Equity and Subordinated Debt; rL= Interest rate on loan; rD= Interest rate on deposit; GDP=Gross domestic 
product; TCR=Total Capital Ratio. 
The growth rates of various classes of the bank’s assets and liabilities are regressed upon lagged asset growth, the 
differential between the interest rates on loans and deposits, lagged growth in GDP, and the bank’s capital ratio. 
Equation (1) is applied to identify the growth rate of total assets, loans, equity investments, mortgages, net loans, 
investment in government securities, equity, and subordinated debt of Australian banks. 
Equation 2, shown below, is developed to identify the effect of Basel II on the growth rate of assets. 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(TCRi,t)  
                     + δ6log(TCRi,t)*Basel II + δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1   (2) 
Equation 2 is derived from equation 1 to identify the effect of Basel II. In equation 2, a dummy variable, Basel II, 
is taken to identify the changes in the sensitivity of capital ratio on assets due to Basel II. The dummy variable, 
Basel II, has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 and value of 0 in the pre-Basel II period 
i.e., before January, 2008. The slope dummy variable, TCR*Basel II, captures the effect of total capital ratio on 
the growth rate of asset and liability in the post-Basel II period as a result of changes in the capital regulations by 
Basel II. The intercept dummy variable, Basel II, identifies the changes in the growth rate between the pre- and 
post-Basel II period.  
To identify the impact of Tier 1 Capital Ratio equations 3 and 4 are used: 
∆log(i,t+1) =1 +2 ∆log(i,t) + 3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − +4 ∆log(GDPt) +5 log(T1CRi,t) 
+ i,t+1        (3) 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(T1CRi,t)  
                     + δ6 log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II + δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1   (4) 
where, T1CR= Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
This paper performs panel unit root tests to check whether the series are stationary. According to panel unit root 
tests, the first difference of log of total asset, total loan, net loan, mortgages, equity investment, investment in 
government securities, total equity and subordinated debt do not have unit root, which indicates that all these series 
are stationary at the 5% level of significance. Lending rate and deposit rate are also stationary. Nevertheless, the 
first difference of log of GDP has one unit root and hence non-stationary. The growth rate of GDP is required in 
this model, which is the first difference of GDP. Therefore, this paper ignores the non-stationarity of the first 
difference of GDP. The results of unit root test are similar for both domestic and international banks. 
Again, the “Jarque-Bera” test is performed to check the normality of the residuals of the panel regressions. 
The residuals of the panel regressions for assets and liabilities of local bank are normally distributed at 5% level 
of significance. However, the residuals of the panel regressions for assets and liabilities except total equity of 
foreign banks are not normally distributed at 5% level of significance. One potential reason may be the limited 
data availability of foreign banks operating in Australia. These banks do not publish annual reports and therefore, 
the data missing in Bankscope cannot be collected. 
 
4.4 Expected Relationship of Variables 
Table 1 shows the summary of relationships between the variables of this paper. The relationship between growth 
rate of loans and equity investments with TCR and T1CR should be positive in the post-Basel II period. Such 
relationship is expected as banks with high risk-adjusted capital ratio would invest more in high-risk assets to 
maintain their statutory capital. Whereas, the relationship between growth rate of mortgages and government 
securities with TCR and T1CR should be negative in the post-Basel II period. It indicates that banks with low risk-
adjusted capital ratio will increase investment in safe securities such as mortgages and government securities. The 
relationship between the growth rate of total asset with TCR and T1CR should be positive as the banks with high 
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risk-adjusted capital ratio would logically invest more. Finally, the relationship between growth rate of equity and 
subordinated debt with TCR and T1CR should be negative in the post-Basel II period because banks with low risk-
adjusted capital ratio would issue more equity or subordinated debt in order to maintain TCR and T1CR. 
The coefficient of intercept dummy variable, Basel II, should be negative for loan, equity investment and 
total asset because these assets should face lower growth rate in the post-Basel II period. Whereas, the intercept 
dummy variable should be positive for mortgages, government securities, equity, and subordinated debt because 
these assets and liabilities should face higher growth rate in the post-Basel II period. 
Table 1: Expected Relationship of Variables 
Hypothesis Number Variable Expectation 
1 Loan, Equity Investment δ6> 0 
2 Mortgages, Government Securities δ6< 0 
3 Total Asset δ6> 0 
4 Equity, Subordinated Debt δ6< 0 
5 Loan, Equity Investment δ7< 0 
6 Mortgages, Government Securities δ7> 0 
7 Total Asset δ7< 0 
8 Equity, Subordinated Debt δ7> 0 
 
5 Findings and Discussion 
The empirical results are divided into two sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2. The sensitivity of various assets and liabilities 
to regulatory total capital ratio and to tier 1 capital ratio are presented in sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.  
 
5.1 Sensitivity to Total Capital Ratio 
The sensitivity of high-risk weighted and low-risk weighted assets, total assets and liability to regulatory total 
capital are exhibited in the following paragraphs.  
5.1.1 High Risk-Weighted Asset 
Table 2 shows the sensitivity of high risk-weighted assets such as total loan, net loan and equity investment to 
regulatory total capital ratio in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II period. The coefficient and t-Statistic of the 
variables are shown in the tables. The t-Statistic of the variables is shown in the bracket. The post-Basel II dummy 
variable, Basel II, is statistically significant and positive for domestic banks’ holdings of net loans and equity 
investments. This means that growth of these high-risk assets is significantly higher in the post-Basel II period. In 
the pre-Basel II period, total capital ratio becomes statistically significantly positive for total loans of international 
banks and equity investments of domestic banks. This can be interpreted as that the slower growth of high-risk 
assets in the pre-Basel II period are caused by Basel I. In the post-Basel II period, total capital ratio becomes 
statistically significantly negative for net loans and equity investments of domestic banks. This means that the 
higher growth of net loans and equity investments of domestic banks in the post-Basel II period is influenced by 
the regulatory changes of Basel II.   
Table: 2 Sensitivity of high-risk assets to total capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 2): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(TCRi,t) + δ6 log(TCRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Total Loan, Net Loan and Equity Investment. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest 
rate on deposit, GDP refer to Gross domestic product, TCR refer to Total Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of 
individual Banks have been collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending 
Rates are collected from Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term 
deposit rate is considered as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment 
rates statistics. Basel II is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 
and value of 0 in the pre-Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008.*, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
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Asset 
∆log(',)) 
Total Loan Net Loan Equity Investment 
Sample Domestic Intl. Domestic Domestic Intl. 
No. of Obs. 111 29 78 94 8 
Constant -0.3489 
(-0.6849) 
-0.5359 
(-1.5393) 
-0.0746 
(-0.1039) 
-2.0033 
(-1.4040) 
7.7331 
(1.6723) 
Basel II 0.8661 
(0.8762) 
-0.0013 
(-0.0034) 
3.2346** 
(2.4750) 
6.5750*** 
(2.5213) 
3.8939 
(2.2826) 
∆log(',)) -0.1053 
(-0.8417) 
-0.0846 
(-0.5053) 
-0.0023 
(-0.0186) 
-0.1704 
(-1.5753) 
0.2362 
(1.1341) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
-0.0954 
(-1.6311) 
-0.0243 
(-0.5772) 
-0.0466 
(-0.9736) 
-0.0027 
(-0.0141) 
0.2041 
(0.8432) 
∆log(G !t) 1.0740 
(0.3553) 
1.3408 
(1.0529) 
-0.5773 
(-0.2753) 
-6.1046 
(-0.7132) 
-122.0031 
(-2.3874) 
log(TCRi,t) 0.2637 
(1.4896) 
0.2283** 
(2.2728) 
0.1369 
(0.4708) 
1.1061** 
(2.3011) 
0.5234 
(0.9383) 
log(TCRi,t)*Basel II -0.3919 
(-0.9719) 
-0.0090 
(-0.0745) 
-1.3657*** 
(-2.5155) 
-2.7487*** 
(-2.5994) 
-1.3529 
(-2.2301) 
5.1.2 Low Risk-Weighted Asset 
The sensitivity of low risk-weighted assets to regulatory total capital ratio in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II 
period for domestic banks are shown in Table 3. International banks do not hold government securities and 
mortgages. The post-Basel II dummy variable, Basel II, is not statistically significant for domestic banks’ holdings 
of government securities and mortgages. This suggests that there is no change in the growth of these low-risk 
assets in the post-Basel II period. Both in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II period, the total capital ratio becomes 
statistically insignificant for government securities and mortgages of domestic banks. This means that the growth 
of low-risk assets is not influenced by the regulatory changes of Basel I and II.     
Table: 3 Sensitivity of low-risk assets to total capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 2): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(TCRi,t) + δ6 log(TCRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Government Securities and Mortgages. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest rate 
on deposit, GDP refer to Gross domestic product, TCR refer to Total Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of 
individual Banks have been collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending 
Rates are collected from Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term 
deposit rate is considered as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment 
rates statistics. Basel II is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 
and value of 0 in the pre-Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
Asset 
∆log(',)) 
Government Securities Mortgages 
Sample Domestic Domestic 
No. of Obs. 70 78 
Constant 0.8438 
 (0.6629) 
-0.4724 
(-0.8887) 
Basel II -2.6603 
(-1.1637) 
1.4362 
(1.5433) 
∆log(',)) -0.0771 
(-0.6406) 
-0.0879 
(-0.7271) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
0.2509 
(1.2825) 
-0.0453 
(-1.2751) 
∆log(G !t) -8.5009 
(-1.1010) 
-0.8896 
(-0.5752) 
log(TCRi,t) -0.3616 
(-0.8312) 
0.3380 
1.5708 
log(TCRi,t)*Basel II 1.3769 
(1.4858) 
-0.6188 
(-1.5984) 
5.1.3 Total Asset 
Table 4 shows the sensitivity of total assets to regulatory total capital ratio in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II 
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period for both domestic and international banks. The post-Basel II dummy variable, Basel II, is not statistically 
significant for domestic and international banks’ holdings of total assets, suggesting no change in the growth of 
total assets in the post-Basel II period. In the pre-Basel II period, total capital ratio becomes statistically 
significantly positive for total assets of domestic banks. This can be interpreted as that the slower growth of total 
assets of domestic banks are caused by the regulatory changes of Basel I. In the post-Basel II period, total capital 
ratio becomes statistically insignificant for total assets of domestic and international banks. This means that the 
growth of total assets is not influenced by the regulatory changes of Basel II.     
Table: 4 Sensitivity of total assets to total capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 2): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(TCRi,t) + δ6 log(TCRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Total Asset. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest rate on deposit, GDP refer to 
Gross domestic product, TCR refer to Total Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of individual Banks have been 
collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending Rates are collected from 
Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term deposit rate is considered 
as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment rates statistics. Basel II is 
a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 and value of 0 in the pre-
Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
Asset 
∆log(',)) 
Total Assets 
Sample Domestic Intl. 
No. of Obs. 112 29 
Constant -0.3638 
(-1.0631) 
0.0785 
(0.2142) 
Basel II 0.8493 
(1.3188) 
-0.2849 
(-0.6776) 
∆log(',)) 0.2385**
 
(2.2690) 
-0.0397 
(-0.2322) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
-0.0870** 
(-2.2200) 
-0.0142 
(-0.2836) 
∆log(G !t) 1.3185 
(0.6546) 
1.0498 
(0.7851) 
log(TCRi,t) 0.2403** 
(2.0122) 
0.0312 
(0.3048) 
log(TCRi,t)*Basel II -0.3935 
(-1.5017) 
0.0552 
(0.4023) 
5.1.4 Liability 
The sensitivity of equity and subordinated debt to regulatory total capital ratio in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel 
II period for both domestic and international banks are shown in table 5. The post-Basel II dummy variable, Basel 
II, is not statistically significant for domestic and international banks’ holdings of equity and subordinated debt, 
which means that thereis no change in the growth of equity and subordinated debt in the post-Basel II period. In 
the pre-Basel II period, total capital ratio becomes statistically significant and positive for equity and subordinated 
debt of domestic banks. This suggests that the slower growth of equity and subordinated debt of domestic banks 
in the post-Basel II period are caused by the regulatory changes of Basel I. However, in the post-Basel II period, 
total capital ratio becomes statistically insignificant for the domestic and foreign banks’ holdings of equity and 
subordinated debt. This means that the growth of equity and subordinated debt is not influenced by the regulatory 
changes of Basel II. 
Table: 5 Sensitivity of liabilities to total capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 2): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(TCRi,t) + δ6 log(TCRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Equity and Subordinated Debt. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest rate on deposit, 
GDP refer to Gross domestic product, TCR refer to Total Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of individual Banks 
have been collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending Rates are collected 
from Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term deposit rate is 
considered as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment rates statistics. 
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Basel II is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 and value of 0 
in the pre-Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
Liability 
∆log(',)) 
Equity Subordinated Debt 
Sample Domestic Intl. Domestic Intl. 
No. of Obs. 112 29 109 12 
Constant -0.5955 
(-1.4931) 
0.2537 
(0.9539) 
-0.2201 
(-0.4427) 
0.8977 
(0.2416) 
Basel II 0.6354 
(0.8440) 
-0.0630 
(-0.2102) 
1.2724 
(1.4188) 
1.8521 
(0.5766) 
∆log(',)) -0.0791 
(-0.8130) 
0.1264 
(0.5971) 
-0.2482*** 
(-2.5860) 
-0.4039 
(-0.4553) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
0.0052 
(0.1124) 
0.0211 
(0.6216) 
-0.0873 
(-1.5720) 
-0.1458 
(-0.5411) 
∆log(G !t) 2.4389 
(1.0341) 
-0.6195 
(-0.6813) 
-4.8792* 
(-1.7294) 
-6.1646 
(-0.1852) 
log(TCRi,t) 0.2365* 
(1.7018) 
-0.0501 
(-0.6899) 
0.3841** 
(2.1651) 
-0.0657 
(-0.0708) 
log(TCRi,t)*Basel II -0.2489 
(-0.8127) 
0.0086 
(0.0889) 
-0.5780 
(-1.5787) 
-0.6636 
(-0.5323) 
 
5.2 Sensitivity to Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
The sensitivity of high-risk weighted and low risk weighted assets, total asset and liability to tier 1 capital ratio are 
displayed in the following paragraphs.  
5.2.1 High Risk-Weighted Asset 
Table 6 shows the sensitivity of high risk-weighted assets such as total loans, net loans and equity investments to 
the regulatory tier 1 capital ratio during the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II period. The post-Basel II dummy variable, 
Basel II, is statistically significant and positive for domestic banks’ holdings of net loans which means that growth 
of net loans of domestic banks are significantly higher in the post-Basel II period. In the pre-Basel II period, tier 1 
capital ratio becomes statistically significant and positive for total loans of international banks. This suggests that 
the slower growth of total loans of international banks in the pre-Basel II period are caused by Basel I. In the post-
Basel II period, tier 1 capital ratio becomes statistically significant and negative for net loan of domestic banks. 
This means that the higher growth of net loans of domestic banks in the post-Basel II period is influenced by the 
regulatory changes of Basel II.  
Table: 6 Sensitivity of high-risk assets to tier 1 capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 4): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(T1CRi,t) + δ6 log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Total Loan, Net Loan and Equity Investment. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest 
rate on deposit, GDP refer to Gross domestic product, T1CR refer to Tier 1 Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of 
individual Banks have been collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending 
Rates are collected from Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term 
deposit rate is considered as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment 
rates statistics. Basel II is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 
and value of 0 in the pre-Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008.*, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
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Asset 
∆log(',)) 
Total Loan Net Loan Equity Investment 
Sample Domestic Intl. Domestic Domestic Intl. 
No. of Obs. 110 29 77 94 8 
Constant 0.2373 
(0.6100) 
-0.4423 
(-1.5572) 
0.0152 
(0.0386) 
-0.4999 
(-0.4422) 
7.9437 
(2.0100) 
Basel II 0.0904 
(0.1504) 
0.0632 
(0.2209) 
1.0128* 
(1.6505) 
1.7758 
(1.0629) 
3.2648 
(2.7368) 
∆log(',)) -0.0844 
(-0.6549) 
-0.1195 
(-0.7110) 
0.0024 
(0.0185) 
-0.1334 
(-1.1934) 
0.2147 
(1.1051) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
-0.0982* 
(-1.6571) 
-0.0300 
(-0.7259) 
-0.0675 
(-1.3758) 
-0.0311 
(-0.1536) 
0.1514 
(0.6489) 
∆log(G !t) 0.9683 
(0.3133) 
1.3531 
(1.0927) 
0.3151 
(0.1468) 
-5.7976 
(-0.6547) 
-119.2842 
(-2.5917) 
log(T1CRi,t) 0.0316 
(0.2425) 
0.2110** 
(2.5327 
0.1072 
(0.6663) 
0.5721 
(1.6321) 
0.4423 
(1.3243) 
log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II -0.0853 
(-0.3037) 
-0.0255 
(-0.2621) 
-0.5151* 
(-1.7691) 
-0.9006 
(-1.1909) 
-1.2340 
(-2.8905) 
5.2.2 Low Risk-Weighted Asset 
The domestic banks’ sensitivity of low risk-weighted assets to regulatory tier 1 capital ratio during the pre-Basel 
II and post-Basel II period are shown in Table 7. The post-Basel II dummy variable, Basel II, is not statistically 
significant for domestic banks’ holdings of government securities and mortgages, which indicates that there is no 
change in the growth of these low-risk assets in the post-Basel II period. Both in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel 
II period, tier 1 capital ratio becomes statistically insignificant for government securities and mortgages of 
domestic banks. This suggests that the growth of low-risk assets is not influenced by the regulatory changes of 
Basel I and Basel II.     
Table: 7 Sensitivity of low-risk assets to tier 1 capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 4): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(T1CRi,t) + δ6 log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Government Securities and Mortgages. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest rate 
on deposit, GDP refer to Gross domestic product, T1CR refer to Tier 1 Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of 
individual Banks have been collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending 
Rates are collected from Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term 
deposit rate is considered as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment 
rates statistics. Basel II is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 
and value of 0 in the pre-Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008. *, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
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Asset 
∆log(',)) 
Government  
Securities 
Mortgages 
Sample Domestic Domestic 
No. of Obs. 70 77 
Constant 0.7818 
(0.7863) 
0.2294 
(0.7972) 
Basel II -1.2483 
(-0.8393) 
0.3230 
(0.7465) 
∆log(',)) -0.0903 
(-0.7426) 
-0.0771 
(-0.6291) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
0.2786 
(1.4119) 
-0.0542 
(-1.500) 
∆log(G !t) -8.5193 
(-1.100) 
-0.7135 
(-0.4529) 
log(T1CRi,t) -0.4178 
(-1.2225) 
0.0507 
(0.4296) 
log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II 0.9371 
(1.3660) 
-0.1778 
(-0.8641) 
5.2.3 Total Asset 
Table 8 shows the sensitivity of total assets to regulatory tier 1 capital ratio in the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II 
period for both domestic and international banks. The post-Basel II dummy variable, Basel II, is not statistically 
significant for domestic and international banks holdings of total assets indicating no change in the growth of total 
assets in the post-Basel II period. The tier 1 capital ratio becomes statistically insignificant for both the domestic 
and international banks’ holdings of total assets in both the pre-Basel II and post-Basel II period. This suggests 
that the growth of total assets is not influenced by the regulatory changes of Basel I and Basel II.     
Table: 8 Sensitivity of total assets to tier 1 capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 4): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(T1CRi,t) + δ6 log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Total Asset. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest rate on deposit, GDP refer to 
Gross domestic product, T1CR refer to Tier 1 Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of individual Banks have been 
collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending Rates are collected from 
Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term deposit rate is considered 
as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment rates statistics. Basel II is 
a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 and value of 0 in the pre-
Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008.*, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
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Asset 
∆log(',)) 
Total Assets 
Sample Domestic Intl. 
No. of Obs. 111 29 
Constant -0.0008 
(-0.0031) 
0.0099 
(0.3251) 
Basel II 0.1649 
(0.4265) 
-0.1303 
(-0.3933) 
∆log(',)) 0.2521** 
(2.3431) 
-0.0509 
(-0.2953) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
-0.0918** 
(-2.3046) 
-0.0155 
(-0.3113) 
∆log(G !t) 1.4107 
(0.6810) 
1.1171 
(0.8427) 
log(T1CRi,t) 0.1062 
(1.2175) 
0.0546 
(0.6395) 
log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II -0.1325 
(-0.7373) 
0.0066 
(0.0584) 
5.2.4 Liability 
The sensitivity of equity and subordinated debt to regulatory tier 1 capital ratio during the pre-Basel II and post-
Basel II period for both domestic and international banks are shown in Table 9. The post-Basel II dummy variable, 
Basel II, is not statistically significant for domestic and international banks’ holdings of equity and subordinated 
debt, which means that there is no change in the growth of equity and subordinated debt in the post-Basel II period. 
In the pre-Basel II period tier 1 capital ratio becomes statistically significant and positive for equity and 
subordinated debt of domestic banks. This means that the slower growth of equity and subordinated debt of 
domestic banks are caused by the regulatory changes of Basel I. In the post-Basel II period tier 1 capital ratio 
however becomes statistically significant and negative for the domestic banks’ holdings of subordinated debt. Such 
outcome can be identified as that the higher growth of subordinated debt in the post-Basel II period are influenced 
by the regulatory changes of Basel II. Therefore, in order to support the growth of risk-weighted assets domestic 
banks are issuing more subordinated debt to maintain the capital ratio because of the regulatory changes caused 
by Basel II.   
Table: 9 Sensitivity of liabilities to tier 1 capital ratio 
This table reports the estimation results from the following regression models (see equation 4): 
∆log (Ai,t+1) = δ1+ δ2 ∆log(Ai,t) + δ3 (
)Dt
L
t rr − + δ4 ∆log(G !t) + δ5 log(T1CRi,t) + δ6 log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II + 
δ7Basel II+  "i,t+1 
where, At refer to Equity and Subordinated Debt. rL refer to Interest rate on loan, rD refer to Interest rate on deposit, 
GDP refer to Gross domestic product, T1CR refer to Tier 1 Capital Ratio. Balance Sheet data of individual Banks 
have been collected mainly from Bankscope database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Lending Rates are collected 
from Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) Indicator Lending Rates statistics and one-year term deposit rate is 
considered as the borrowing rate which is collected from RBA’s retail deposit rate and investment rates statistics. 
Basel II is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 in post-Basel II period i.e., after January, 2008 and value of 0 
in the pre-Basel II period i.e., before January, 2008.*, **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. The sample covers the annual data from 2000to 2010. 
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Liability 
∆log(',)) 
Equity Subordinated Debt 
Sample Domestic Intl. Domestic Intl. 
No. of Obs. 111 29 108 12 
Constant -0.4491 
(-1.4994) 
0.1644 
(0.7398) 
-0.0938 
(-0.2579) 
0.6254 
(0.1857) 
Basel II 0.3703 
(0.8361) 
0.0125 
(0.0530) 
0.7410 
(1.4140) 
1.7316 
(0.6602) 
∆log(',)) -0.0939 
(-0.9414) 
0.1394 
(0.6561) 
-0.2463*** 
(-2.6453) 
-0.5524 
(-0.6663) 
D
t
L
t rr −  
0.0014 
(0.0302) 
0.0219 
(0.6429) 
-0.1008* 
(-1.8467) 
-0.1525 
(-0.5753) 
∆log(G !t) 2.6761 
(1.1238) 
-0.5534 
(-0.6117) 
-4.3691 
(-1.5592) 
-3.8263 
(-0.1153) 
log(T1CRi,t) 0.1998** 
(2.0030) 
-0.0249 
(-0.4124) 
0.3816*** 
(3.0182) 
-0.0257 
(-0.0295) 
log(T1CRi,t)*Basel II -0.1630 
(-0.7913) 
-0.0179 
(-0.2240) 
-0.4245* 
(-1.7315) 
-0.6942 
(-0.6045) 
 
6 Robustness Check 
Robustness of these results has been checked by identifying whether the behaviour of the Australian banks change 
in anticipation of the implementation of Basel II in earlier period such as January, 2006. To check the robustness, 
it is tested that whether banks start to adjust their asset portfolios from January, 2006 with an expectation to the 
implementation of Basel II. The reason for choosing the year 2006 is that the final rules of Basel II were developed 
on November, 2005. In the robustness check, the effect of Basel II is tested from 2006. A dummy variable, post_06, 
is considered which has a value of 1 from January, 2006 and onwards and value of 0 before January, 2006. The 
results indicate that the growth of net loans of domestic banks is significantly higher after 2006 with respect to 
total capital ratio. In addition, the higher growth of net loans of domestic banks after 2006 with respect to total 
capital ratio is influenced by the regulatory changes of Basel II. The results also indicate that the growth of 
subordinated debt of domestic banks is significantly higher after 2006 with respect to both total capital ratio and 
tier 1 capital ratio. Again, the higher growth of subordinated debt of domestic banks after 2006 with respect to 
both total capital ratio and tier 1 capital ratio are influenced by the regulatory changes of Basel II. However, the 
slower growth of subordinate debt of domestic banks before 2006 with respect to both total capital ratio and tier 1 
capital ratio are caused by the regulatory changes of Basel I. There is no change in the growth of low-risk asset 
and total assets after 2006 and these are not affected by Basel II as well. Therefore, the robustness check confirms 
that the growth of high-risk weighted assets is higher in post-Basel II period and Basel II affects it. In addition, 
banks issue more subordinate debt in the post-Basel II period to maintain capital ratio. Therefore, we can infer that 
Basel II has started to affect banks’ portfolio decision from 2006 and the robustness check supports the findings 
of the study. 
 
7 Limitation and Further Research Implications 
One potential limitation of the study is that limited data of foreign banks as the foreign subsidiary banks do not 
publish annual reports. Therefore, data of foreign banks that are missing cannot be collected. The number of banks 
operating in Australia is relatively small and the majority of the banking activities are captured by the four major 
banks named Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, National Australia 
Bank Limited and Westpac Banking Corporation. This feature of Australian banks may affect the analysis of this 
paper. 
Future research could be performed by using the data of risk-weighted assets considering the credit rating of 
counter parties of each asset category. However, data availability may be a wishful thought. 
 
8 Conclusion 
This paper has been the first attempt to identify the sensitivity of various risk-weighted assets and liabilities to 
total regularity capital and core regulatory capital after the implementation of Basel II on Australian banks. The 
analysis of this paper show that the growth of total assets does not change in the post-Basel II period and the 
growth of total assets are not influenced by Basel II. Therefore, this research rejects the capital crunch hypothesis 
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of shrinkage of the assets of banks induced by the stricter capital requirement in the post-Basel II period in 
Australia. However, this paper finds that the shrinkage of total assets in the pre-Basel II period is caused by the 
regulatory changes come with Basel I with respect to the regulatory total capital ratio. The findings of this paper 
also show that in the post-Basel II period, Australian banks face higher growth of non-residential loans and equity 
investments and the higher growth of these assets are caused by the regulatory changes of Basel II. Therefore, this 
paper does not find the evidence of credit crunch hypothesis in the post-Basel II period in Australia, which assumes 
that stricter capital requirement induces banks to reduce their loan supply.  
However, there is no change in the growth of low-risk assets such as mortgages and government securities 
and Basel II does not cause the growth in the post-Basel II period. Therefore, this paper infers that the rigorous 
capital regulation originated by Basel II do not provide an incentive for banks to expand the investment in low-
risk assets and to curtail the investment in high-risk assets in Australia. Another finding is that, in the post-Basel 
II period, the banks have issued more subordinated debt to maintain the capital ratio with respect to regulatory Tier 
1 capital ratio. Nevertheless, in the pre-Basel II period, the slower growth of equity and subordinated debt is caused 
by Basel I. The robustness check shows that banks have started to change their asset portfolio from 2006 with an 
expectation to the implementation of Basel II. This paper supports that Australian banks are very well capitalized 
and financially sound because the stricter capital regulation does not force them to reduce total assets and loan 
supply. It is expected that these findings could help policy makers to set up Basel III more accurately so that the 
possibilities of banking failures and financial crises in Australia do not exist. 
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 Appendices 
Appendix A 
List of Local Australian Banks 
Serial 
No. Name of the Bank 
1 Adelaide Bank Ltd. 
2 AMP Bank Limited 
3 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
4 Bank of Queensland Limited 
5 Bank of Western Australia Limited 
6 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited 
7 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
8 Macquarie Bank Ltd 
9 Members Equity Bank Pty Ltd 
10 National Australia Bank Limited 
11 Rural Bank Limited 
12 St. George Bank Limited 
13 Suncorp-Metway Ltd 
14 Westpac Banking Corporation 
 
Appendix B 
List of Foreign Australian Banks 
Serial 
No. Name of the Bank 
1 Arab Bank Australia Limited 
2 Bank of China (Australia) Ltd 
3 Bank of Cyprus Australia Pty Ltd 
4 Citigroup Pty Limited 
5 HSBC Bank Australia Limited 
6 ING Bank (Australia) Limited 
7 Investec Bank (Australia) Limited 
8 Rabobank Australia Limited 
 
